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ABSTRACT
The study aims to investigate the lock-up provisions of initial public offering’s (IPOs) and its effects on trading volume changes around the lock-up 
expiry date of Malaysian IPOs by using both the event study methodology and the comparison period returns approach (CPRA). Unlike the US and the 
UK, Malaysia’s lock-up length is fixed and the number of shares that should be under the lock-up is pre-determined by the security commission. The 
sample comprises 379 Malaysian IPOs, issued from January 2001 to December 2011. The results of the event study methodology and CPRA shows 
a positive abnormal trading volume at lock-up expiry date for IPO market, except for the ACE market, construction and technology sectors, which is 
negative and is not consistent with our hypothesis and there is no evidence in previous literatures regarding the significant negative trading volume 
before and after the lock-up. High trading volume at and around the lock-up expiration is compatible with shareholders’ selling due to diversification 
reasons and wealth recognition and which is also an indication of insider’s lack of confidence about a company’s future prospect. Significant negative 
trading volume can be interpreted in a way that insiders of those related boards and sectors do not sell their shares significantly but would rather watch 
what would happen to the market and are optimistic about Market’s future. Furthermore, when we do not adjust the trading volume for the market, 
the CPRA methodology does not show abnormal trading volume between event window and non-event windows.
Keywords: Lock-up Provision and Malaysiain Initial Public Offering Market, Trading Volume Behaviour, Trading Board 
JEL Classifications: G02, G10, G14, G18, G38
1. INTRODUCTION
How the initial public offering’s (IPO) firm can decrease investors’ 
uncertainty? The study of Williamson (1996) mentioned lock-up as 
a bonding mechanism is a proper tool for reducing the uncertainty 
around any non-spot transaction. Lock-up, or better known as share 
moratorium in Malaysia, and lock-in in the UK, means controlling 
shareholders of IPO firms to bind themselves not to sell portions 
of their shareholdings during a lock-up period immediately after 
the IPO. The exact lock-up expiry date and the portion that can 
be sold each time are mentioned in the prospectus of every IPO 
firm. In some countries, the length of lock-up is flexible, while in 
others, is fixed by the related authorities. In Malaysia the lock-up 
period is determined by security commission (SC) and is fixed.
Generally, lock-up contracts exist to reduce the information 
asymmetries between shareholders and managers, following the 
IPO (Brau et al., 2004). Lock-up is attractive to investors due to 
accessibility to significant information related to uncertainty of 
the IPOs within the duration of share lock-up, and the fact that 
lock-up duration signals the issuer’s uncertainties.
The concept of uncertainty proposes that investors will diverge 
in their expectations because uncertainty produces disagreement 
and as believed by many scholars, investors’ disagreement leads 
to high trading volume. Karpoff’s (1986) model contends that 
trading volume is a good proxy divergence for opinion among 
investors and therefore, rises in trading volume means investors 
either have divergent understanding on information or have similar 
understanding which were divergent before expectations.
In addition, other studies such as Harris and Raviv (1993), 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2002), and Hong and Stein (2003), show 
that divergent opinions motivate trading activity. Trade activities 
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happen shortly following the lock-up expiry date and show the 
market’s attitude to the company’s actual value. In most cases, 
lock-up expiry can critically hit the stock market as by the time 
the lock-up expires, company insiders come into the market and 
the amount of public float stocks rise greatly. Many scholars have 
reported a substantial price decline and a persistent rise in trading 
volume around lock-up expiry (Ofek and Richardson, 2000; 
Bradley, et al., 2001; Field and Hanka, 2001). The outcomes reveal 
that the market explains heavy trading as bad and thin trading as 
good news (Mohan and Chen, 2002). As such in Malaysia lock-
up length is fixed and pre-determined, significant trading volume 
will show uncertainty of investors and insiders about company’s 
future prospect. Therefore, investigating the movement of trading 
volume around the lock-up expiry will be a useful indication for 
investors, which show the insiders opinion about the company.
The study of Espenlaub et al. (2001) indicates that US lock-up 
durations is almost standardized at 180 days while the UK shows 
greater difference. In the Malaysian market, several required 
lock-up periods are imposed and are compulsory, whereas the 
US and UK markets are free of these compulsory rules. In the 
case of Malaysian IPOs, lock-up provision for each board and 
some sectors are different which creates a unique opportunity to 
examine the trading volume around the lock-up expiration dates.
In Asian capital markets, IPO plays an important role in assigning 
new capital. The importance of the screening practice by Malaysian 
regulators to identify the performance of the IPO and equity market 
is inline with Malaysia’s aspiration to become the world’s hub for 
Islamic capital market and a developed country in the year 2020.
Given the importance of such behavioural implications, this 
paper seeks to examine one of the main events of each IPO firm 
that could potentially explain insiders’ heterogeneous beliefs in 
a sample of 379 IPOs in Malaysia. This study is expected to be a 
main contribution to the literature on trading behaviour of insiders 
after the lock-up expiry date of Malaysian IPOs. In this paper, 
two different event study methodology and hypothesise are used. 
The results indicate that the abnormal volume around the unlock 
day is significantly positive for the IPO market, some sectors and 
trading board. Beside this increase, there is a significant decrease in 
trading volume for the ACE market, construction and technology 
sectors, which is not consistent with our hypothesis and there is no 
evidence in previous literatures regarding the significant negative 
trading volume before and after the lock-up.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following the 
introduction section, Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents 
the results, whilst Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Brav and Gompers (2003) propose that insiders can signal quality 
of the company using three tools: under-pricing, the portion of 
stocks locked-up, and the duration of lock-up. After the expiration 
date, only the percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders can 
be sold. This percentage of sold shares can raise the public float 
and enlarge information asymmetry among insiders and buyers. 
Mohan and Chen (2002) assert that a lower trading volume after 
an expiration of lock-up is good news, but large trading volume 
is bad news. Unlike the US and UK, Malaysian lock-up length is 
fixed and the amount of shares which should be under the lock-up 
is pre-determined by SC thus, lock-up length does not carry any 
information about insider’s behaviour. But, the trading volume 
around unlock day is a good proxy for insider’s perception of 
the company.
A model by Leland and Pyle (1997) declares that the portion of 
shares kept by insiders at the IPO time can be accepted as a signal 
of quality. Hence, insiders of high quality companies like to keep 
most of their shares after the IPOs, and consequently remain more 
undiversified.
Ofek and Richardson (2000) mention that we can expect certain 
features after the lock-up expiration. Particularly, we can expect 
rise in trading volume because of change in supply of shares and 
the reason behind this rise is amount of liquidity trading (non-
information based). Secondly, rise in trading volume shows an 
asset price risk diversification of insiders.
Field and Hanka (2001), Alamer (2015a; 2015b), Bradley et al. 
(2001) and Ofek and Richardson (2000) express that lock-up 
expiration causes a persistent 40% rise in trading volume. Field 
and Hanka (2001) interpret that an insider trading activity sends 
noticeable signals for the investors, as the lack of confidence of 
insiders about the futures’ prospects, motivates sales of stocks after 
the expiration. Consequently, sales by insiders at and around the 
expiration day may generate negative signals (Brau et al., 2004).
Cao et al. (2004) assert that at and around lock-up expirations, 
significant diversification selling happens and cause a growth in 
market liquidity. The reason behind it is that primary owners and 
early investors generally have a big portion of their personal wealth 
involved in the company. Moreover, Cao et al. (2004) mention 
that most of the sales seem to be information selling because the 
lock-up expiry is the initial opportunity for insiders to offer their 
stocks without early declaration and, therefore, there is an initial 
chance to perform on their personal intuitions about the companies’ 
actual value without suffering from all the expenses of any price 
decreases by revealing their trades.
Bajo (2010) argues that abnormal trading volume is inline 
with Fama’s et al., hypothesis (1969), if it is simultaneous with 
announcing of new information. It is not common or normal that 
stock exchange commissions use trading volume as a means of 
control and find probable misuses (Bajo, 2010). Bajo (2010) 
mentions that abnormal trading volume is created by informed 
traders hence, this extra trading activity may cause future share’s 
excess performance.
Bajo (2010) cites abnormal trading by itself does not show a 
plausible sign for the future returns; consequently, by reviewing the 
trading volumes, it is not possible to distinguish between bad and 
good effective events. Bajo (2010) argues that abnormal trading 
is a positive signal on average.
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By delving into the Malaysian literature in the IPOs field, the results 
show more research on the performance of an IPO itself while there 
is a gap in studies on the effect of expiration of lock-up contracts 
on the trading volume (Appendix). However, lock-up provision is 
compulsory for new issuance companies in Malaysia, but there is 
a slight difference in length of lock-up provision in each Board. 
We can compare the results, and see in which Board and sector(s) 
the fluctuation of trading volume is higher. This outcome shows in 
which sector(s) the financial efficiency is more than others.
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1. Sample and Procedures
The sample employed in this study comprises all IPOs listed 
on the Main Board, Second Board, MESDAQ, Main and ACE 
market after the lock-up expiration from January 2001 to 
December 2011. The final sample of 379 includes all offer for 
sale IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia that are affected by lock-up 
agreements is used. January 2001 is selected as the beginning 
date since the after-effects of the 1997 financial crisis had been 
negated by that time. This study defines the event horizon 
as the (−20, +20) days’ time period surrounding the lock-up 
expiry. The variable that is used in this study is trading volume. 
Besides the main methodology of the study, the Masulis (1980) 
comparison period returns approach (CPRA) methodology is also 
used as a robustness test. In addition, for the CPRA methodology, 
the event horizon is (−30, +30) days’ time period surrounding the 
lock-up expiry. The data employed in this research were collected 
from the Bursa Malaysia website (http://www.bursamalaysia.
com), the SC (www.SC.com.my), the star online website (http://
biz.thestar.com.my/marketwatch/ipo), the http://www.klse.info 
website and Datastream.
3.2. Proposed Hypotheses
Mostly, IPOs may show abnormal trading activities after the lock-
up expiration as an index of insider confidence. Hence, the heavy 
sale of insiders instantly after the lock-up expiry is understood as a 
clue of low insider confidence. This is explained to be a bad signal 
related to the companies’ prospects. On the other hand, if there are 
no abnormal changes in insider trading volume subsequent to the 
lock-up expiry, it is seen by the investors as a signal of high insider 
confidence, and thus, a pleasant index of future company value. 
Ofek and Richardson (2000) and Field and Hanka (2001) and 
Brau et al. (2004) prove the results of other scholars, on positive 
abnormal volume surrounding the unlock day.
H1: The abnormal volume around the unlock day is significantly 
positive for the IPO market.
This hypothesis is divided into two parts: In Malaysia, firms are 
listed on trading boards of the Bursa Malaysia and are classified 
into different sectors which show their main businesses. Here, 
we can breakdown the sample by industrial sectors and board 
of listing. By breaking down the sample in this way, the source 
of variation in the trading volume of lock-up expiration due 
to a company’s specific characteristics and broad economic 
characteristics may be traced (Page and Reyneke 1997).
H1.1: The abnormal volume around the unlock day for each board 
is significantly positive.
H1.2: The abnormal volume around the unlock day for each sector 
is significantly positive.
3.3. Methods
This section explains two methodologies used to calculate and 
test the effects of volume around lock-up expiries.
3.3.1. Analysing abnormal volume
Binder (1998) argues the event study methodology is the standard 
method to test the effect of some event on company shareholders’ 
fortunes. Goergen et al. (2010), in their paper on the Hong Kong 
IPO market, applied the following equations for measuring 
abnormal daily trading volume around the unlock day:
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This equation is used to calculate the market adjusted volume ratio 
(MAVR), VRit of firm i on day t. In this formula, Vit is the trading 
volume of firm i and Vmt is the market index on day t. The Vmt can 
be downloaded from datastream database. AVRt is a daily average 
abnormal volume across N companies:
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And, MAVRs is average abnormal volume for N companies in the 
event window (t1, t2), where S is:
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respectively.
For testing the AVRt and MAVRs, the standard t-test is applied. If 
the AVRt and MAVRs are bigger than one, the trading volume on 
day t over the event window is abnormal.
3.3.2. CPRA
Along with the mentioned methodology for capturing the abnormal 
trading volume around the lock-up expiration, the CPRA by 
Masulis (1980) is also conducted. CPRA methodology is used for 
confirming the results of the previous method. According to Brown 
and Warner (1980) study, the CPRA is as powerful as the market 
adjusted approaches. In this methodology, mean daily trading 
volume (MDTV) for comparison period (non-event period) and also 
observation period (event period) is calculated. Actually, the event is 
the lock-up expiration day. We define an event period (event window) 
as (−2, +2) days prior and following the event day for capturing the 
effects of lock-up expiration and the comparison period as (−30, 
+30) days before and after an event period (Masulis, 1980). All the 
hypotheses are the same as the ones in the previous method, but we 
test MDTV instead of AVs. The related null hypotheses are as follow:
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H0: The MDTV is zero for IPO market, all trading boards and 
all sectors.
A null hypothesis for comparison period is as below:
H0: The MDTV of the event period equals the MDTV of the non-
event period for IPO market, all trading boards and all sectors.
4. FINDINGS
4.1. Profiles of the IPOs Sample
Table 1 shows number of companies in each board between January 
2001 and December 2011. Total number of active companies for 
main, second, MESDAQ boards and main and ACE markets is 
379 between the years of 2001 and 2011.
4.2. Sectors
Table 2 shows the number of companies with a complete set of 
trading volume, in each sector from January 2001 until December 
2011. The Mining sector is excluded from analysis because of less 
number of companies.
4.3. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables (Trading 
Volume) During the Event Window from 2001 to 2011
Table 3 shows two event windows - The first event window’s 
duration is (−20, +20) and the second event window’s (CPRA) 
duration is (−30, +30) days before and after the expiration day. The 
lowest mean trading volume belongs to the Main Board, which is 
266,000 shares and the highest mean trading volume belongs to 
the Main Market, which is 1,235,000 shares. The lowest trading 
volume range is 541,581,000 shares, which belongs to the main 
board and the highest trading volume range is 44,488,000 shares 
which belong to the main market.
4.4. Abnormal Volume Surrounding the Lock-up 
Expiration Day for Each Board and IPO Market
The market-adjusted abnormal volume ratio (AVR) is not 
significantly bigger than one on the first day of the Main 
Board’s lock-up expiration, revealing that there is no abnormal 
trading volume. The average MAVR over the (−20, +20), 
(−2, +2) and (−7, +7) windows around the first lock-up expiry 
is significantly bigger than one with values of 1.681, 1.747 and 
2.319, respectively.
The AVR is not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry 
day and other days except day three after the lock-up expiry of the 
second board, indicating that there is no abnormal trading volume. 
The MAVR over the (−20, +20), (−2, +2) and (−7, +7) windows 
around the first lock-up expiry is significantly bigger than one with 
values of 3.781, 4.290 and 3.584, respectively.
The AVR is not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry day 
of the first and second MESDAQ lock-up expiration; this shows 
that there is no abnormal trading volume. The MAVR over the 
(−20, +20), (−2, +2) and (−7, +7) windows around the first lock-up 
Table 1: Number of companies in each board
Panel A Main board Second board MESDAQ Total
2001 6 14 20
2002 19 16 8 43
2003 17 18 14 49
2004 14 23 26 63
2005 10 16 41 67
2006 3 7 22 32
2007 10 8 2 20
2008 7 8 8 23
Total 86 110 121 317
Panel B Main market ACE market
2009 11 2 13
2010 21 6 27
2011 12 10 22
Total 44 18 379
After 3rd August 2009, the structure of Bursa Malaysia changed from three boards to the 
main and ACE markets, respectively. The number of companies before 3rd August 2009 
for main and second boards is 10 and 1, respectively
Table 2: Numbers of companies with a complete set of 
close price each sector
Construction 10
Consumer products 65
Finance 5
Industrial products 109
Mining 1
Plantation 5
Property 16
Technology 83
Trading/services 85
Total 379
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of trading volume during the event window from 2001 to 2011
Model N Mean Median SD Range
Volume, main board, first method 3526 270.90 78.7 553.60 5415.80
Volume, main board, CPRA 5246 266.54 80.6 559.38 6020.80
Volume, second board, first method 4510 542.38 76.0 1498.70 21662.70
Volume, second board, CPRA 6710 513.33 66.0 1470.79 21662.70
Volume, MESDAQ first expiry, first method 4961 993.93 140.2 2067.79 13900.30
Volume, MESDAQ first expiry, CPRA 2684 867.98 130.0 1797.23 13900.30
Volume second expiry, first method 4961 278.86 100.0 507.95 4670.70
Volume, MESDAQ second expiry, CPRA 7381 296.02 114.6 527.24 4670.70
Volume, main market, first method 1804 1235.32 232.6 2964.45 44488.10
Volume, main market, CPRA 2684 1247.63 227.9 3164.66 44488.10
Volume, ACE first method 738 364.93 80.4 1099.96 14394.50
Volume, ACE, CPRA 1098 368.13 91.6 969.78 14394.50
Volume, IPO market, first method 15539 649.35 108.3 1894.11 44488.10
Volume, IPO market, first method 15539 649.35 108.3 1894.11 44488.10
SD: Standard deviation, CPRA: Comparison period returns approach, IPO: Initial public offering’s
Zameni and Yong: Lock-up Expiry and Trading Volume Behaviour of Malaysian IPO’s
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 6 • Special Issue (S3) • 201616
expiry is significantly bigger than one with values of 1.968, 2.869 
and 2.271, respectively.
The AVR and the MAVR are not significantly bigger than one on 
the first expiry day of the Main Market expiration, which denotes 
that there is no abnormal trading volume.
The AVR is significantly less than one on the first expiry day of the 
first ACE lock-up expiration, meaning that there is no abnormal 
trading volume as what we want. Trading volume does not rise 
significantly one day after the expiry of the first lock-up period. 
The MAVR over the (−20, +20) and (−2, +2) windows around 
the first unlock day is significantly lesser than one with values of 
0.794 and 0.534. Field and Hanka (2001) also report that volume 
for VC backed companies reduces after expiration and goes to its 
highest point on day +1.
The AVR is significantly different from one on the first expiry day 
for the IPO market, showing that there is abnormal trading volume. 
In addition, seven days before expiry and seven days after expiry 
show an abnormal trading volume. On the expiry day, trading 
volume increases by 161%. Trading volume rises significantly 
by 118% one day after lock-up expiration. The MAVR over the 
(−20, +20), (−2, +2) and (−7, +7) windows around the first lock-up 
expiry is significantly bigger than one with values of 2.275, 2.725 
and 2.424, respectively (Table 4).
4.5. Abnormal Volume Surrounding the Lock-up 
Expiry for Each Sector (Trading Volume Effect)
The AVR is significantly lesser than one on the first expiry day 
of the Construction sector. This result denotes that there is no 
abnormal trading volume as what we are looking for (Table 5).
The AVR is significantly bigger than one on the first expiry day of 
the consumer products sector, demonstrating that there is abnormal 
trading volume. Nevertheless, trading volume rises significantly 
by 269% one day after the expiry of the first lock-up period. 
The MAVR over the (−20, +20), (−2, +2) and (−7, +7) windows 
around the first lock-up expiration is significantly bigger than 
one with values of 2.961, 4.876 and 3.73, respectively. The AVR 
is not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry day for 
the industrial products sector, meaning that there is no abnormal 
trading volume. The MAVR over the (−20, +20), (−2, +2) and 
(−7, +7) windows around the first unlock day is significantly 
bigger than one with values of 2.857, 2.352 and 1.962, respectively.
The AVR is not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry 
day of the Properties sector, denoting that there is no abnormal 
trading volume. The MAVR over the (−2, +2) and (−7, +7) 
windows around the first unlock day is significantly bigger than 
one with values of 1.581 and 1.280, respectively. The AVR is 
not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry day of the 
Plantation and Finance sectors, outlining that there is no abnormal 
trading volume.
The AVR is significantly lesser than one on the first expiry day 
of the Technology sector, asserting that there is abnormal trading 
volume at 10% significance level but not as we expect. The T
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MAVR over the (−2, +2) window around the first unlock day is 
significantly lesser than one with value of 0.677.
The AVR is not significantly bigger than one on the first expiry day 
of the trading/services sector, highlighting that there is no abnormal 
trading volume. The MAVR over the (−20, +20), (−2, +2) and (−7, 
+7) windows around the first lock-up expiry is significantly bigger 
than one with values of 1.768, 1.511 and 1.551.
4.6. Results of Comparison Period Return Approach
A Table 6 follows which compares the MDTV (for trading volume) 
of portfolio’s lock-up expiry period (event period) with the mean 
MDTV of pre and post lock-up expiry which is called comparison 
period. They report significant MDTV for all trading Boards, 
sectors and IPO market.
4.6.1. Abnormal trading volume for all trading boards and IPO 
market
Table 6 shows a MDTV of all trading Boards, IPO market and 
sectors of Malaysia’s stock Market during lock-up expiration. 
In addition, Table 6 shows significant difference between mean 
MDTV of event period and non-event period.
There is no significant MDTV for the unlock day of the main board, 
second board, first MESDAQ expiration and main market, but for 
days surrounding it, there is abnormal daily trading volume. There 
is a significant MDTV for the unlock day for the second MESDAQ 
expiration and ACE market. The mean of MDTV of the event 
period equals the mean MDTV of non-event period for all sectors.
There is a significant MDTV for the lock-up expiry, and the week 
before and after IPO market. The MDTV of the event period 
equals the MDTV of non-event period for IPO market. Espenlaub 
et al. (2001) mention that higher volume at and around the lock-
up expiration is compatible with shareholders’ selling due to the 
diversification reasons.
4.6.2. Abnormal trading volume around the lock-up expiry for 
each sector
There is no significant MDTV for the lock-up expiry of the 
construction, consumer products, industrial products, properties, 
technology and trading/services sectors (Table 6). There is a 
significant MDTV for the lock-up expiry of the finance and 
plantation sectors. The mean MDTV of the event period equals 
the mean MDTV of non-event period for all sectors.
Day after lock-up expiration shows a significant increase in MDTV 
for the Second Board, Consumer Products, Industrial Products 
and Trading/Service sectors. Day after lock-up expiration shows a 
significant decrease in MDTV for the main board and main market 
and also for the properties sector.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The study aims to investigate the IPO lock-up provision and its 
effects on trading volume changes around the lock-up expiry date 
of Malaysian IPOs by using both the event study methodology 
and the CPRA as proposed by Masulis (1980). Unlike the US and T
ab
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the UK, Malaysia’s lock-up length is fixed and number of shares 
should be under the lock-up is pre-determined by SC. The sample 
comprises of 379 Malaysian IPOs, issued from January 2001 to 
December 2011.
As we expected, there is a significant increase in most boards, 
sectors and IPO market. A volume rise after the lock-up expiration 
is also cited by Field and Hanka (2001), Bradley et al. (2001) and 
Ofek and Richardson (2000). Field and Hanka (2001) interpret that 
an insider trading activity sends noticeable signals to the investors 
as the lack of confidence of insiders about the company’s future 
prospects, which motivates sales of stocks after the expiration. On 
the other hand, if there are no abnormal changes in insider trading 
volume subsequent to the lock-up expiry, it should be seen by the 
investors as a signal of high insider confidence and thus, a pleasant 
index of future company value.
Beside this increase, there is a significant decrease in trading 
volume for the ACE market, construction and technology sectors, 
which is not consistent with our hypothesis and there is no 
evidence in previous literatures regarding the significant negative 
trading volume before and after the lock-up. These results can 
be interpreted in a way that insiders of those related boards and 
sectors do not sell their shares significantly and watch what will 
happen to the market in future and are optimistic about future. 
Furthermore, when we do not adjust the trading volume for the 
market, the CPRA methodology does not show abnormal trading 
volume between event window and non-event windows. There is 
a rise in the IPO market but there is a significant negative mean 
daily trading for the second MESDAQ expiration, ACE market, 
finance and plantation sectors, which is close to the result of the 
first methodology. As conclusion, for the expiry day, the first 
and second methodologies show almost the same result, but 
in the wider window, there is a difference between these two 
methodologies due to market adjustment.
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APPENDIX
Lock-up contracts and insider trading in Malaysia (extracted from Bursa Malaysia and SC).
This part explains the rules and regulations and also insider trading on the Main and Second Boards, MESDAQ, main market and ACE 
market of Bursa Malaysia. Actually, most of this part talks about the listing requirements that have been taken from the Bursa Malaysia 
and Security Commission websites.
Before 3 August 2009, the types of companies that could be listed on the main board, second board and MESDAQ were different from 
main market and ACE market. The Main and Second Board’s moratorium based on Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirement is as below:
i. Main and second board: Yes.
ii. MESDAQ board: Yes, moratorium is applied for all listings.
The following explains the rules and regulations based on listing requirement from the Main Market and ACE Market (after 3 August 
2009).
i. Lock-up period of main market: “promoters” entire shareholdings for 6 months from the date of admission.
2- ACE market: Promoters’ entire shareholdings for six (6) months from the date of admission, subsequent selling down with conditions.
i. The moratorium assigns to the entire shareholdings of the promoters of an applicant for a period of 6-month from the date of 
admission to the exchange.
ii. Upon the expiry of the 6-month period stated above, the listed corporation must ensure that the promoters’ aggregate shareholdings 
amounting to at least 45% of the nominal issued and paid-up ordinary share capital of the listed corporation remain under moratorium, 
for another period of 6-month.
iii. Thereafter, subject to sub-rule (d) below, the promoters may sell, transfer or assign up to a maximum of 1/3rd per annum (on a 
straight-line basis) of the shares held under moratorium.
